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Abstract:   
A laboratory experiment examined whether one structural feature of groups, members' physical 
positioning, may produce asymmetry in their perceived contribution to a task. In particular, we 
investigated asymmetry in group members' (often excessive) claims of credit for collective tasks 
("the self-serving attributional bias"). Consistent with the availability account of this bias, group 
members located in the middle of a group, with easy visual access to their partners' contributions, 
demonstrated less bias than outside members (who demonstrated bias consistent with prior 
research), but no less satisfaction. Further analyses suggested that these results reflected bias 
reduction among middle members, and did stem from visual availability. We conclude that the 
visual constraints imposed by physical positioning influence the availability of information and 
thus generate asymmetric attributional bias, with implications for conflict and its reduction. 
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Did I do that? Group positioning and asymmetry in attributional bias 
 
Abstract 
A laboratory experiment examined whether one structural feature of groups – members’ 
physical positioning – may produce asymmetry in their perceived contribution to a task. In 
particular, we investigated asymmetry in group members’ (often excessive) claims of credit for 
collective tasks (“the self-serving attributional bias”). Consistent with the availability account of 
this bias, group members located in the middle of a group, with easy visual access to their 
partners’ contributions, demonstrated less bias than outside members (who demonstrated bias 
consistent with prior research) – but no less satisfaction. Further analyses suggested that these 
results reflected bias reduction among middle members, and did stem from visual availability. 
We conclude that the visual constraints imposed by physical positioning influence the 
availability of information and thus generate asymmetric attributional bias – with implications 
for conflict and its reduction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Asymmetry, self-serving attributional bias, group positioning, group performance, 
conflict 
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Introduction 
Envision three researchers, seated in a row, discussing new study ideas. If the researchers 
and their participants behave alike, then the discovery of a great idea may convince each person 
that their contribution to the idea generation process was considerable. To the extent that each 
claims credit, this conclusion, natural in groups (Bazerman & Neale, 1982; Neale & Bazerman, 
1983; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992), may generate dissatisfaction with the whole experience. 
This dissatisfaction, in turn, may discourage the researchers from working together in the future 
(Ross & Sicoly, 1979).  
Although many factors contribute to successful group work, this thought experiment 
illustrates the harm that the self-serving attributional bias (defined as assigning more credit to the 
self, especially for positive outcomes, than is objectively-due) (Bradley, 1978; Miller & Ross, 
1975; M. Ross & Sicoly, 1979) can cause in groups. It also highlights an important structural 
feature of all groups: their members’ physical positioning (“seated in a row”). The current paper 
examines whether physical positioning influences individual group members’ espousal of the 
self-serving attributional bias. Specifically, we investigate whether group members located in 
different places display asymmetric levels of bias. 
Researchers have identified the self-serving attributional bias as an important source of 
dissatisfaction and conflict in negotiations (Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997; Babcock, 
Loewenstein, Issacharoff, & Camerer, 1995; Loewenstein, Issacharoff, Camerer, & Babcock, 
1993; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992; Wade-Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996), and 
work groups (Caruso, Epley, & Bazerman, 2006; Corgnet, 2010; Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 
2006). In both contexts, egocentric interpretations lead individuals, regardless of their actual 
contributions, to claim a larger share of the credit than warranted. As a result, group members 
often disagree on the allocation of the joint outcome. Promoting effective groups and minimizing 
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group conflict thus require mitigating the self-serving attributional bias (hereafter called 
“attributional bias”).  
Although researchers have documented this bias for several decades (Bradley, 1978; 
Mezulis, et al., 2004; Miller & Ross, 1975; Mullen & Riordan, 1988; Roese & Olson, 1993; M. 
Ross & Sicoly, 1979; Zuckerman, 1979), investigations of how to mitigate it (Caruso, et al., 
2006; Epley, et al., 2006) have only come to the fore more recently. Recent investigations focus 
on the cognitive bases of the attributional bias; they tend to recommend that group members 
actively attend to one another’s contributions. Whereas actively focusing on one’s own 
contribution exacerbates egocentric judgments and behaviors (Burger & Rodman, 1983; M. Ross 
& Sicoly, 1979), actively focusing on others’ contributions reduces attributional bias (Savitsky, 
Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005).  
However, these studies (Caruso, et al., 2006; Epley, et al., 2006) stress that asking group 
members to focus on others’ contributions may carry a pernicious side-effect: genuine 
contributors, focusing on others’ negligible contributions, become increasingly dissatisfied with 
the group effort and less interested in future collaboration. Thus, although an active focus on 
others does reduce attributional bias, it does not reduce the attendant dissatisfaction. Indeed, this 
solution is limited by generating more of the dissatisfaction it was intended to reduce (e.g., 
Caruso et al., 2006).  
Accordingly, we sought to document not only the existence of asymmetric attributional 
bias but any effects of asymmetry on satisfaction. If the asymmetry reflected bias reduction, for 
example, we sought to determine whether that reduction generated comparable dissatisfaction. 
Since the predicted driver of asymmetric bias (physical positioning) is a structural variable, we 
expected it to operate at a relatively unconscious level (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; L. Ross & 
Nisbett, 1991) – at least compared to the “focus on others” approach above. In other words, we 
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predicted that individuals’ positioning was less likely to evoke conscious effort comparisons than 
an overt directive to focus on others. Thus, we expected any observed asymmetries to come 
without the changes in satisfaction characteristic of conscious comparisons. If so, and if the 
asymmetries reflected bias reduction, so much the better: at least for middle group members, we 
thought they would. 
In sum, we set out to examine whether: 1) simple, structural features of groups (like 
physical positioning) can create asymmetric levels of bias across group members, whether 2) this 
asymmetry comes without the unintended consequences of “focusing on others,” and whether 3) 
the asymmetry reflects bias reduction for middle group members. To the extent that positioning 
made others’ contributions more available without evoking conscious comparisons, we expected 
that it would reduce the bias without the side-effects.  
Attributional Bias 
A number of researchers in the 1970’s (e.g., Bradley, 1978; Miller & Ross, 1975; M. 
Ross & Sicoly, 1979) brought the existence, ubiquity, and implications of the attributional bias to 
psychologists’ attention. This is but one of the many self-oriented biases that psychologists have 
uncovered. Indeed, a variety of judgments vary widely when they concern the self versus others. 
People often indicate, for example, that they are better drivers (Svenson, 1981), better teachers 
(Gilovich, 1991), more skilled managers (Larwood & Whittaker, 1977), and less prone to 
adverse health events (Weinstein, 1980) than others. More recently, Epley and Dunning (2000) 
found that people overstate the probability that they will be generous and charitable, and Heath 
(1999) showed that people believe that they are more motivated by intrinsic factors (like learning 
new things from a job) than their peers are. 
Researchers have established the robustness of the attributional bias, in particular, across 
both laboratory settings (M. Ross & Sicoly, 1979) and field settings (Mullen & Riordan, 1988) 
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like sports. A recent meta-analysis of 266 studies, with 503 independent effect sizes, (Mezulis, et 
al., 2004), yielded an average d equal to 0.96, indicating a large bias. Since the initial 
formulations of attributional bias, psychologists have grappled with two classes of explanations 
for it – motivational (self-enhancement) (e.g., Bradley, 1978) and cognitive (availability) (e.g., 
Miller & Ross, 1975). The motivational explanations suggest that self-serving attributions reflect 
a need to see the self positively (Bradley, 1978). The cognitive explanations suggest that these 
judgments reflect the differential availability of information about the self and others (Miller & 
Ross, 1975).  
Psychologists have amassed evidence for both explanations, and both probably contribute 
to the phenomenon (Tetlock & Levi, 1982). Considering all of the evidence, the two 
explanations seem a classic case of paradigms unlikely to be resolved through a critical test 
(Tetlock & Levi, 1982). Following recent investigations (e.g., Caruso, et al., 2006; Epley, et al., 
2006), we take no position with respect to this debate, but assume that availability accounts for at 
least a portion of the attributional bias. Under that assumption, we examine the ability of 
structural variables like physical positioning to influence the availability of information about the 
self and others – and thus generate asymmetries in attributional bias. 
Availability and Asymmetry in Attributional Bias 
An availability account of the attributional bias holds that we ascribe excessive credit to 
ourselves because what we have done is more apparent, memorable, and retrievable than what 
others have done (Miller & Ross, 1975; M. Ross & Sicoly, 1979). Whereas we have direct access 
to our own efforts (we experience them ourselves, as an actor), we have no direct access to 
others’ efforts. Their contribution is unclear. Because we cannot access others’ efforts, these 
efforts are easy to underestimate at each stage of the process: perception, encoding, and retrieval 
(Miller & Ross; M. Ross & Sicoly, 1979). The availability account thus posits a cognitive 
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mechanism – processing of asymmetric information about the self and others – which naturally 
evokes biased attributions. Thus, asymmetric perceptions lie at the heart of the attributional bias, 
raising the possibility that they might also motivate its solution. 
It follows from the availability account that any factors capable of reducing the 
asymmetry – by making others’ contributions more available vis-à-vis our own – should reduce 
the attributional bias. A variety of investigators (e.g., Burger & Rodman, 1983; Caruso, et al., 
2006; Epley, et al., 2006; M. Ross & Sicoly, 1979; Savitsky, et al., 2005) have provided 
consistent evidence, finding that an active focus on others’ contributions can make their 
contributions more available. All of these approaches, however, rely upon a focal actor 
consciously changing his or her behavior by focusing more attention on others. This conscious 
focus, in turn, evokes clear comparisons between the efforts of oneself and others (Caruso, et al., 
2006; Epley, et al., 2006).  
Groups attempting to implement the “focus on others” solution in practice may face 
several challenges. Individual members may react to instructions constraining something as 
fundamental as the object of their attention (Brehm, 1972), perhaps even by focusing more 
attention on themselves (Storms, 1973). In organizations, individuals may simply ignore 
instructions leading them to downplay their own contributions when such instructions conflict 
with other, self-relevant goals like career advancement (Gioia & Sims, 1985). Finally, and most 
importantly: when individuals do comply with requests to focus on others’ contributions, the act 
of doing so can generate dissatisfaction (Caruso, et al., 2006; Epley, et al., 2006), especially 
among genuine contributors.  
The reason is that individuals instructed to consider the contributions of others tend to 
anchor on their own contributions (Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 2000), making any gap in 
contributions especially salient (Caruso, et al., 2006; Epley, et al., 2006). Thus, an active focus 
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on another’s contributions evokes a contrast effect (Sherif & Hovland, 1961), making the 
contribution gap (not the other’s absolute contributions) salient. Gaps that seem inequitable then 
prompt dissatisfaction (Loewenstein, Bazerman & Thompson, 1989). Ultimately, the most 
inequitable gaps are those seen by genuine contributors. Thus, even if the intervention leads 
groups to espouse less bias overall, genuine contributors tend to leave the groups dissatisfied 
(Caruso, et al., 2006; Epley, et al., 2006). 
These findings, if ambiguous for the “focus on others” solution, do suggest a relatively 
unexplored feature of attributional bias: Asymmetry at the individual level. The fact that genuine 
contributors feel less satisfied than others after considering contributions suggests that group 
members may espouse different levels of attributional bias, at least subjectively. Thus, treating 
the bias of each member as equivalent may mask important differences across group members. 
Additionally, the prior findings suggest the form of an alternate remedy: Since dissatisfaction 
arises from a conscious comparison of own and others’ efforts, a remedy that discouraged 
conscious comparisons might not reduce anyone’s satisfaction.  
Positioning and Asymmetric Bias 
These considerations led us to examine variables that operate unconsciously, but 
powerfully: structural variables, defined as subtle, situational factors (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; L. 
Ross & Nisbett, 1991). We reasoned that these variables, operating unconsciously, would be less 
likely to prompt conscious effort comparisons, reactance (Brehm, 1972), or refusal. Among 
structural variables, our study investigated whether one – physical positioning – could influence 
attributional bias without the satisfaction side-effects. 
Psychologists have demonstrated repeatedly that structural variables can have vast and 
powerful effects (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). People are unlikely to react (Brehm, 1972) against these factors because, in 
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many cases, the factors are unlikely to be perceived – at least not as attempts to constrain their 
behavior (L. Ross & Nisbett, 1991). Thus, we did not expect these variables to generate 
reactance or refusal. Likewise, whereas conscious comparisons call forth contrast judgments 
(Lombardi, Higgins, & Bargh, 1987), structural variables can influence the availability of 
information without prompting any judgments at all (L. Ross & Nisbett, 1991). In this case, we 
predicted that structural variables could make others’ contributions more or less apparent without 
calling for a comparison. 
We focused on physical positioning, defined as where each group member sits in 
comparison to others – choosing this variable because it offered a particularly clear test of the 
availability mechanism described above. Although many structural variables can influence the 
availability of contributions, positioning directly manipulates this salience by controlling 
individuals’ field of vision: positions make it easy to see some group members and hard to see 
others. Given the need to position every group somehow, positioning was likely to focus 
attention unconsciously, altering the visual availability of others without prompting conscious 
comparisons. To the extent that positioning made others more available, we expected individuals 
to demonstrate less bias: configurations that maximized visibility should minimize bias. Indeed, 
the more people can see something, the easier it is for them to cognitively-retrieve information 
about it (Gabrielcik & Fazio, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), and the more easily they can 
retrieve information, the more likely they will make attributions that reflect it (Higgins & Lurie, 
1983; Pryor & Kriss, 1977; Rholes & Pryor, 1982).  
Here, we examined three-person groups, with members seated in a row, on the premise 
that this configuration would maximize asymmetry between group members’ perceptions, and 
thus create asymmetry in their contribution judgments. The position that would make others 
contributions’ most visible is the middle. From this position, individuals can see both others, 
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along with their contributions. By comparison, sitting on the outside affords full exposure to the 
contributions of just one other person. The mere availability of more or less information about 
contributions should create asymmetries in attributional bias. Thus, in a three-person group: 
Hypothesis 1: The middle group member will demonstrate less attributional bias than 
either of the people on the outside. 
 
Thus, in a sense, outside group members served as controls for middle group members. Because 
our primary goals were to demonstrate that: 1) asymmetric bias exists in groups and 2) the bias 
can be explained by the availability associated with positioning; we were most concerned with 
documenting that middle members demonstrate the least bias.  
Most research on the bias has used three-person groups (Mezulius, et al., 2004), in which equal 
visual access – by everyone, to everyone – is probably the exception. Thus, we reasoned that 
prior participants had experiences more like our outside group members than our middle 
members. Accordingly, we predicted that outside members’ bias would resemble prior 
participants’ bias; thus, the middle position in our study would reduce bias, rather than the 
outside position increasing it. Because members in any position should contribute an average of 
one-third of the group’s outcome, claims of one-third or less from middle, but not outside 
members would provide support. If outside members claimed contributions consistent with prior 
research, this claim would be even stronger. A recent investigation of the bias using a 
questionnaire methodology (Caruso, et al., 2006) documented individual credit claims of 
approximately 47%. Thus, in the strongest form: 
Hypothesis 2: Middle group members will claim approximately one-third of the credit, 
while outside members will claim closer to 47% of the credit. 
 
On a more exploratory basis, we also examined the underlying mechanism. If visual 
availability is the mechanism, then others’ perceived contributions should also vary as a function 
of positioning. Specifically, group members should see those directly within their field of vision 
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as contributing more than others. For three-person groups in a row, this suggests that outside 
group members will rate middle members as contributing the most, while middle members will 
rate both of their counterparts as contributing about the same. Experimental logistics only 
allowed us to test this prediction on a subset of our sample, so we advance it as an exploratory 
prediction rather than a formal hypothesis. Likewise, we expected positioning to reduce 
attributional bias without influencing group members’ satisfaction, predicting that all members’ 
satisfaction would be equivalent. Given the null nature of this prediction, we examined the 
associated means and p-values rather than presenting it as an additional hypothesis. 
Study: Group Positioning 
We conducted a laboratory study, assigning group members’ positions to influence the 
extent to which they could effectively witness others’ contributions. We assembled participants 
into three-person groups and asked groups to complete a numbers task involving the 
identification of as many numbers as possible that met predetermined conditions. We then 
isolated participants and asked them to complete a questionnaire about their relative contribution 
to the group. We also asked them to complete another numbers task, to provide an approximation 
of their objective contribution. We compared attributions of responsibility for participants with 
different physical positioning in the group, generally expecting middle members to exhibit the 
lowest levels of attributional bias. 
Participants 
We recruited 66 undergraduate participants (40% women) from a major University in 
Spain, using campus-wide advertisements, to participate in an experiment about “Decision 
Making.” The participants were mostly (95%) Business and Economics majors in their third 
year. We do not report gender effects in this study since: 1) we did not find any, 2) a similar, but 
independent study with a sample of 165 undergraduate participants revealed no gender effects 
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(Corgnet & Sutan, 2007), and 3) classic research in this arena (e.g., M. Ross & Sicoly, 1979) 
suggests the absence of gender effects. All study procedures were conducted in Spanish, but 
were independently translated to English for the current paper. Our experiment was completed in 
three sessions of approximately twenty participants each. Participants learned that the experiment 
would last for 60 minutes, and that they would receive a show-up fee of 5 euros (equivalent to 
$6.50 at the time), plus a potential performance-based payment. Average earnings for the three 
experimental sessions were 18 euros ($23.40). 
Design 
Procedures. At the start of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned a number 
and a letter (e.g., 1-L) that indicated, respectively, their group’s number and their individual, 
physical positioning in the group. Each group was composed of three members randomly 
assigned to sit in a row, on one side of a rectangular desk, in a private room. Participant L sat to 
the left of participant M, and participant R to the right, following signs placed on the table. In the 
first stage of the experiment, groups had 18 minutes to find three- and four- digit numbers 
fulfilling certain conditions, described below. This “numbers” task was adapted from prior 
research using numerical optimization tasks (e.g., van Dijk, Sonnemans, & van Winden, 2001, 
Montmarquette, Rulliere, Villeval, & Zeiliger, 2004). Each correct number earned a 45 euro 
cents ($0.58) bonus, while each incorrect number garnered a penalty of 30 euro cents ($0.39). 
Each group had access to only one set of instructions and one answer sheet, to encourage 
members to work together. In addition, members had to communicate and coordinate to avoid 
finding the same correct answers to the task.  
Group task. In the group task (described to participants as “task 1”), groups received the 
following instructions:  
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You have 18 minutes to find as many numbers as you can, satisfying the following 
conditions: 
•   It has 3 or 4 digits. 
•   If you sum its digits the result is equal to 15. 
•   If you multiply its digits the result is strictly larger than 10. 
•   The last two digits are strictly larger than 1. 
•   The first digit is an odd number. 
•   The second digit is an even number. 
 
Groups recorded their numbers on a shared answer sheet. 
 
Individual tasks. In the individual portion of the experiment (described as “task 2”), 
participants went to private cubicles and answered a series of paper-based questions, individually 
and without communication, to assess their contribution to the joint outcome during the first task. 
The Appendix details these questions. 
Then, participants completed an individual numbers task, which was essentially the same 
as the group task. The only difference was that the digits had to sum to 14 instead of 15. In the 
individual task, each correct number earned 30 euro cents ($0.39), while each incorrect number 
incurred a penalty of 15 euro cents ($0.20). Because the individual task essentially required 
participants to repeat the group task alone, participants’ individual performance both measured 
their individual ability and provided an approximation of their involvement in the group task. In 
other words, participants’ individual performance allowed us to construct an estimate of their 
actual contributions to the joint outcome in the group task. Our argument is based on the finding 
that performance on this task involves a learning component so that a participant who 
contributed heavily to the group task would tend to perform well on the individual task too.  An 
independent sample (Corgnet, 2010), N=60, confirmed that: experienced participants 
outperformed inexperienced participants by approximately 30%. Thus, we felt comfortable using 
individual performance as an initial approximation of contribution to the group task.  
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Of course, our estimate of contributions is imperfect. For example, participants may have 
exerted less effort when working in a group as a result of social loafing (Jackson & Harkins, 
1985; Karau & Williams, 1993), distorting our measure of contribution based on individual 
performance. However, there is no reason to expect a different relationship between loafing and 
individual performance as a function of positioning, meaning that any bias would be randomly-
distributed across conditions. Furthermore, participants themselves felt that their efforts on the 
two tasks were comparable: Twenty out of twenty-one participants (95%) during the first data 
collection indicated that they exerted the same level of effort in both the individual and in the 
group task. Ultimately, any distortions are likely to reduce our statistical power, creating a 
conservative test. 
Independent Measures 
Participants were randomly assigned to a physical position in the group. The positioning variable 
identified whether a participant was located in the middle (coded as 1) or on the outside (coded 
as 0). We also recorded whether outside participants sat on the right or left. 
Dependent Measures 
We created four, partially-overlapping measures of attributional bias and a measure of 
participants’ satisfaction. We first measured group members’ claims about their own contribution 
to the joint output (following Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006), calling it “perceived 
contribution.” Our second measure, which we called “estimated contribution,” gauged the 
relative performance of group members on the individual task (task 2). Our third measure, called 
“estimated bias,” was the difference between perceived contribution and estimated contribution. 
Finally, we created a measure of attributional bias at the group level called “aggregate perceived 
contribution,” corresponding to the sum of group members’ perceived contributions. A separate 
item, detailed below, assessed participants’ satisfaction. 
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Perceived contribution. We assessed individuals’ perceived contribution by analyzing 
their answers to the following, open-ended question, asked in the individual stage of the 
experiment: “What was your individual contribution, in percentage terms, from 0% to 100%, to 
the performance of the group?” By design, this measure gauges the perceived, rather than actual 
contribution of each group member. To estimate members’ actual contributions, we introduced 
the following measure. 
Estimated contribution. Our estimate of a given participant’s contribution in the group 
task was based on an independent measure of ability on the task. Estimated contribution of group 
members to the joint outcome was measured as the ratio between their individual performance 
and the sum of all group members’ performances during the individual task. If all members 
reached the same level of performance in the individual task, the estimated contribution of each 
member would be equal to one-third. 
Estimated bias. We then used our estimate of group members’ contributions, defined 
above, to construct a measure of estimated bias. Estimated bias was operationalized as the 
difference between their perceived contribution and estimated contribution, defined previously. 
Aggregate perceived contribution. This group-level measure was computed as the sum of 
group members’ perceived contributions. An aggregate perceived contribution significantly 
greater than one reveals the existence of biases at the group level. 
Satisfaction. We measured participants’ satisfaction by asking the following question 
during the second stage of the experiment: “How would you rate your satisfaction with your 
work group experience in task 1 (1=Very poor, 2=Poor, 3=Acceptable, 4=Good, 5=Very 
Good)?” 
Results and Discussion 
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Before exploring the hypotheses, we first sought to document the existence of the 
attributional bias in our sample. The average perceived contribution was equal to 42.8% (see 
Table 1). This average, perceived contribution is comparable to similar studies based on a 
questionnaire methodology (Caruso, et al., 2006; M. Ross & Sicoly, 1979). We can reject the 
hypothesis that the mean perceived contribution in our sample equals one-third, t(65) = 5.42, p < 
0.001, d = 1.35. In addition, the computation of the aggregate perceived contribution measure 
indicates that all of the twenty-two groups except one exhibited bias at the group level. We can 
reject the hypothesis that aggregate perceived contribution (128.4%) is equal to one, t(21) = 5.35, 
p < 0.001, d = 2.33.  
Hypothesis 1 predicted that middle group members would demonstrate less bias than 
outside members. Our data provided support (see Table 2): Middle members claimed less credit 
for the group’s outcome (M = 0.38, SD = 0.13) than did outside members (M = 0.45, SD = 0.15), 
t(64) = 2.03, p = 0.05, d = 0.51. Figure 1, a histogram of perceived contributions for middle and 
outside members, presents these findings graphically. We pooled data from outside members 
since, as predicted, claims for contribution did not significantly differ between group members 
seated on the left (M = 0.45, SD=0.14) and right (M = 0.45, SD = 0.16), t(42) = -0.03, p = 0.98, d 
= -0.01. 
Additional evidence for Hypothesis 1 came from an OLS regression in which we 
controlled for the effect of the estimated contribution of each group member: 
PCOi = α0 + α1CONi + α2POSi + εi 
 
where PCOi is member i’s perceived contribution. The variable CONi is the estimated 
contribution of member i as measured using group members’ relative performances in task 2. 
The variable POSi is a dummy variable that takes value one if member i was in the middle. The 
regression allowed us to examine perceived contributions as a function of both position and 
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estimated, actual contribution; its results are displayed in Table 3. As indicated there, physical 
positioning significantly predicted members’ perceived contributions to the joint outcome, even 
after controlling for estimated individual contribution. The coefficient associated with physical 
positioning was negative, meaning that middle group members offered lower perceptions of their 
own contributions to the joint outcome than other group members did. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the middle position would effectively reduce attributional 
bias. In support, the credit claimed by middle members did not differ significantly from one-
third, t(21) = 1.72, p = 0.10, d = 0.75, while the credit claimed by outside members was 
significantly greater than one-third, t(43) = 5.46, p < 0.001, d = 1.67. In addition, middle 
members exhibited significantly lower estimated bias (M = 0.03, SD = 0.13) than outside 
members did (M = 0.13, SD = 0.15), t(64) = 2.52, p = 0.01, d = 0.63. Estimated bias did not 
differ between group members seated on the left (M = 0.15, SD = 0.16) and right (M = 0.11, SD 
= 0.15), t(42) = 0.91, p = 0.37, d = 0.28. In addition, the biases of outside group members 
resembled the biases of participants in Caruso, et al. (2006). As noted these authors documented 
perceived contributions of approximately 47%, remarkably close to the claims of our outside 
members (45%), and substantially higher than those of our middle members (38%). This all 
supports the notion that the middle position reduced bias (Hypothesis 2). 
Consistent with our predictions about the mechanism, outside members’ bias seemed to 
stem from an undervaluation of the contributions made by counterparts at the other end of the 
table. Outside members’ perceptions of their outside counterpart’s contributions (M = 0.26, SD = 
0.16) were significantly less than one-third, t(13) = -1.92, p = 0.04, d = -1.07. Estimated bias (M 
= -0.08, SD = 0.18) was also significantly less than zero, t(13) = -1.78, p = 0.05, d = -0.99.
1
 This 
                                                 
1
 We conducted here directional tests where the alternative hypothesis is that perceived contribution (estimated bias) 
of other outside members is lower than one-third (lower than zero). Our N for these tests is small because laboratory 
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is consistent with a visual access mechanism, since positioning seemed to prevent outside 
members from observing each other’s contributions accurately. Figure 2, a histogram of 
contributions perceived by outside members, presents this information graphically.  
Meanwhile, middle members’ perception of outside members’ contribution (M= 0.33, SD 
= 0.10) did not differ from outside members’ perceptions of middle members’ contributions, 
t(26) = -0.19, p = 0.84., d = -0.07. This suggests that members perceived their neighbor’s 
contribution without bias, whether they sat in the middle or on the outside. Middle members 
seemed to have an accurate perception of other group members’ contributions because they were 
everybody’s neighbor. Also, outside members tended to perceive the contribution of the middle 
group member “objectively,” since the difference between outside members’ perceived 
contribution of the middle member (0.33) and estimated contribution of the middle member 
(0.35) did not significantly differ from zero (M = -0.02, SD = 0.18), t(13) = -0.32, p = 0.75, d = -
0.18. Finally, despite significant differences in the magnitude of attributional biases, we did not 
find significant differences in satisfaction levels between middle members (M = 3.50, SD = 0.91) 
and outside members (M = 3.51, SD = 0.70), t(63) = 0.06, p = 0.95, d = 0.02. On the contrary, 
their reported satisfaction was nearly identical. 
An alternate interpretation of our results would suggest that middle group members, 
because of their positioning, were assigned to clerical tasks such as filling out the answer sheet, 
without contributing to the intellectual effort of the group. However, a pilot question, completed 
by 21 randomly-selected participants indicated that outside group members perceived the middle 
member’s contribution as 32.7% (SD = 0.10), which did not differ significantly from one-third, 
t(13) = -0.10, p = 0.92, d = -0.06. Also, since experience on the numbers task tends to improve 
                                                                                                                                                             
limitations only allowed us to collect this data for a subset of our sample. Thus, we interpret these latter data with 
caution. 
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performance, we would expect middle group members to underperform outside members in the 
individual task if they had dedicated their group interaction to clerical tasks. However, the 
individual performance of middle members (M = 24.7, SD = 9.5) and outside members (M = 
26.1, SD = 10.5) did not differ, t(64)=-0.54, p = 0.59, d=-0.14. In addition, debriefing indicated 
that participants did not consider clerical tasks, like writing numbers on the answer sheet, 
sufficiently important to assign someone exclusively to that endeavor. Instead, most participants 
said that their teams divided the work by numbers, allotting each person a separate range of 
numbers to compare against the criteria. 
General Discussion 
We started our investigation with the conjecture that simple structural variables like 
positioning could create asymmetries in attributional bias, without influencing group members’ 
satisfaction. We even suspected that these asymmetries would reflect reductions in bias for 
middle group members. We derived our predictions from the availability interpretation of the 
attributional bias, under which people ascribe more credit to themselves than is objectively due, 
primarily because what they do is more apparent than what others actually do. 
A laboratory study suggested that physical positioning is at least one structural variable 
that can create a “functional asymmetry,” which we define here as an asymmetry with potential 
benefits for the group. Operating through the availability mechanism, members located in the 
middle of a group demonstrated less bias than members seated on the outside, with no apparent 
decrement in satisfaction, nor apparent increase in bias from outside members. Indeed, outside 
members demonstrated bias levels consistent with prior research. Apparently, outside members 
had insufficient access to one another’s contributions, and were thus likely to underestimate 
these contributions. In contrast, middle members’ extensive visual access seemed to lend them 
neutrality in credit assignment. Overall, middle members seemed to espouse less bias than prior 
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participants. These findings constituted initial evidence for the effect of at least one structural 
variable, physical positioning, on the magnitude and symmetry of attributional bias. 
Implications for Asymmetry Research 
Our research suggests that a variety of asymmetries characterize and underlie the well-
documented attributional bias. An informational asymmetry (more information about own versus 
others’ contributions) is one mechanism generating biased contribution judgments in the first 
place. A contribution asymmetry (greater actual contributions from some than others) curbs 
genuine contributors’ satisfaction when asked to focus on others, as a means of bias reduction. 
Group positioning exacerbates or reduces informational asymmetry (depending on where the 
individual is located). Therefore, attributional bias itself appears asymmetric. 
Because this latter asymmetry generally seems to reduce the bias of group members with 
enhanced information availability (middle members), leaving others’ biases in-tact, it may 
represent a “functional asymmetry.” Although a broader point based on the functionality of 
asymmetries would be premature, our results do suggest that at least one asymmetry may be 
helpful: Group positioning, conceived with bias reduction in mind, could reduce bias-inspired 
group conflict. More generally, when an asymmetry serves to reduce a dysfunctional feature of 
group life like attributional bias (for some members, without increasing it for others), the 
asymmetry may actually improve overall group functioning. 
Our empirical context allowed us to examine a number of important issues related to 
asymmetry. We identified visual access as an important antecedent of asymmetric bias, and 
availability as one of its mechanisms. Our research suggested that reduced conflict might be one 
important outcome of asymmetric bias. From the results emerge a number of tangible steps that 
organizations and work groups might use to leverage asymmetric bias. Asking group members to 
sit in a circle is one, obvious possibility: circular configurations make the contributions of all 
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group members maximally, though perhaps not equally-available. Another possibility, which we 
discuss in more detail below, is to use mechanisms other than positioning to direct the attention 
of at least some group members toward others’ contributions. 
Implications for Work Groups and Organizations 
Our study suggests that many real, structural variables in work groups and organizations 
(e.g., group size or task) might generate comparable asymmetries in contribution assessments. In 
fact, we have some preliminary data to support both of these possibilities: smaller groups and 
groups working on objectively-measurable tasks both seem to espouse less bias uniformly, not 
asymmetrically, in a paradigm similar to the one above. In addition, many structural variables in 
organizations could influence bias, asymmetrically or otherwise. For example, the presence or 
absence of public metrics (like bulletin boards highlighting sales volume) that make the real-time 
performance of group members clear might influence employees’ contribution judgments. 
Individuals seated in-view of these bulletin boards, for example, might well show reduced bias. 
Our results might guide organizations in designing workspaces and jobs so as to make 
everyone’s actions more visible. For example, when deciding how to structure the workplace, 
managers might use our results to evaluate an “open-floor” plan. Such a plan would, of course, 
make the contributions of group members more salient. Assuming these contributions were 
positive, bias reduction should theoretically follow. When deciding how to structure jobs 
themselves, managers might consider assigning interdependent responsibilities, such that group 
members have visibility into their counterparts’ activities. Of course, in all cases, managers 
would have to balance bias considerations against other management imperatives, like 
maintaining employee privacy.  
Limitations, Future Directions, and Conclusion 
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Our analysis showed that positioning, and possibly other structural features of groups, 
can asymmetrically reduce attributional bias without reducing satisfaction. This suggests that 
structural variables have an important role in improving group performance and reducing group 
conflict, as mediated through asymmetric individual experience. However, our analysis, by 
focusing on physical positioning, constitutes only a preliminary step in developing a 
comprehensive framework to assess the importance of structural variables. Furthermore, the 
current results derived from an undergraduate sample in a laboratory context. Although this 
context afforded control over the many variables confounding real group life, it means that 
generalizing our results to various real-life contexts requires systematic, future research. Such 
research might readily use field experiments amongst group members inside organizations.  
Another promising avenue for future research may involve the influence of information 
technologies on attributional bias. Research has identified a variety of ways that computer-
mediated communication (CMC) systems, in particular, can make others more or less available 
(e.g., Walther, 1996). In organizations, CMC may facilitate the assessment of group members’ 
contributions by disseminating real-time information about these contributions. By precluding 
visual access to the group members themselves, however, CMC may simultaneously compound 
attributional bias. Which way the bias goes in a virtual world is an important question. Research 
could easily address it by comparing the perceived contributions of individuals working side-by-
side with those of individuals working virtually, aided or not aided by real-time metrics. In any 
case, CMC clearly introduces the potential for new forms of asymmetry in bias. 
As this discussion suggests, the current research is a first step that affords many avenues 
for future study. The basic idea that structural variables can reduce attributional bias without 
reducing satisfaction seems general enough to extend across contexts, but specific enough to 
generate clear prescriptions. Overall, managing the structural features of groups seems a low-cost 
Asymmetry in Bias 22 
 
solution to the high-cost dissatisfaction of disaffected group members – a means of harnessing 
asymmetry in service of group harmony. 
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Figure 1: Histogram of perceived contributions and physical positioning 
 
 
Figure 2: Histogram of outside members’ perceived contributions of other outside members 
(outside/outside) and middle members (outside/middle)  
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Table 1: Perceived contributions  
Perceived contributions Total 
(Proportion of participants) 
<1/3 24.2% 
=1/3 9.1% 
>1/3 66.7% 
Average perceived contribution 42.8% 
 
 
Table 2: Perceived contributions and group members’ physical positioning 
Perceived contributions M members 
(Proportion of participants) 
L and R members 
(Proportion of participants) 
<1/3 40.9% 18.2% 
=1/3 9.1% 9.1% 
>1/3 50% 72.7% 
Average perceived contribution 37.7% 45.3% 
 
 
Table 3: OLS regression  
Dependent variable 
Perceived 
contribution 
Coefficient 
(Standard errors) 
 
Constant 
 
 
Contribution (CON) 
 
 
Position (POS) 
 
 
0.302 
(0.053) 
 
0.464*** 
(0.151) 
 
-0.085** 
(0.035) 
 
R² (66 observations) 0.184 
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Appendix: Individual Questionnaire  
These questions were answered after task 1 and before task 2. 
 
Section 1 
What was your individual contribution, in percentage terms, to the performance of the 
group? 
Section 2  
(Outside group members only) 
1-What was the individual contribution to the performance of the group, in percentage 
terms, of the middle participant? 
2-What was the individual contribution to the performance of the group, in percentage 
terms, of the other outside participant? 
(Middle group members only) 
1- What was the individual contribution to the performance of the group, in percentage 
terms, of the participant on your left? 
2- What was the individual contribution to the performance of the group, in percentage 
terms, of the participant on your right? 
Section 3 
1-How would you rate your satisfaction with your work group experience in task 1? 
1=Very poor 
2=Poor 
3=Acceptable 
4=Good 
5=Very Good 
2-Choose one of the following statements: 
I exerted more effort in the individual task 2 than in the group task 1. 
I exerted the same level of effort in the individual task 2 and in the group task 1. 
I exerted a lower level of effort in the individual task 2 than in the group task 1. 
 
 
